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I Introduction
To Chief Justice Earl Warren, footnote eleven in the Brown v. Board of
Education' opinion was little more than a mere afterthought.2 Chief Justice
Warren's perspective on this issue remains remarkable for many reasons, not
the least of which include his role in the opinion, as well as the larger context
surrounding the case. Chief Justice Warren's status as the chief architect of
the Brown opinion, through which the Court directly shaped the equal educa-
tional opportunity doctrine and confronted an issue possessing profound
individual and social consequences, is well documented by historians.3 By
drawing upon empirical social science evidence to inform a core tenet of the
Court's understanding of equal education, the Warren Court established one
of its enduring - if under-appreciated - legacies: the increased empiricization
of the equal educational opportunity doctrine.
Evolving understandings about American education's "Holy Grail" -
equal educational opportunity - have prompted three major reform initiatives
designed to restructure American public schools and better equalize opportu-
nities among students: school desegregation, finance, and choice. All three
initiatives advance our understanding of and commitment to equal educational
opportunity, yet simultaneously arc backwards to Brown by incorporating
empirical social science evidence. School desegregation litigation since
Brown has relied heavily on empirical evidence, much of it assessing possible
relations between a school's racial composition and student achievement.
Similarly, school finance litigation has relied on empirical evidence to estab-
lish a link between school funding and student performance. Finally, the
emerging push for increased school choice, notably litigation regarding
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.Il (1954) (citing psychological
studies); see generally MARK A. CHESLER ET AL., SOCIAL SCIENCE IN COURT: MOBIZING
EXPERTS IN THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES 22 (1988).
3. See generally RICHARD KLUOER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OFBROWVN V BOARD
OPEDUCA7TIONAND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUoLEI FOR EQUALITY (1975) (discussing history of
Brown opinion), WHAT BROWN v. BOARD OFEDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID (Jack M. Balkin
ed., 2001) (same).
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vouchers, possesses a critical empirical dimension that focuses on possible
relations between school choice and student achievement and explores the
implications that choice policies pose for public schools. The palpable
influence of empirical social science on interpretations of equal education
links the Brown opinion with all three successive education reform efforts.
Because one simply cannot know with certainty how equal education
would have evolved absent footnote eleven in the Brown opinion, I am mind-
ful that my thesis rests on an untestable proposition. In light of this limitation,
the scope of my central claim warrants careful clarification and demarcation.
I do not assert that Brown launched the equal education doctrine into a trajec-
tory that it otherwise would not have achieved. Such an assertion is more
expansive than comfort permits. Rather, my more modest claim is that the
Brown opinion influenced, perhaps steepened or accelerated, a tendency -
increased empiricization - already present. However, given the enormity of
Brown in particular and equal education in general, even this claim meaning-
fully contributes to an important Warren Court legacy.
Although Chief Justice Warren famously remarked that footnote eleven
"was only a note, after all,"' I argue that his assessment of footnote eleven
and its contribution to the larger Warren Court legacy badly misses the mark.
If my central claim is correct, it then becomes important to consider the
consequences of an increasingly empiricized equal educational opportunity
doctrine and how those consequences shape the Warren Court legacy. I
consider two of these consequences in this Article and, not surprisingly, find
costs and benefits associated with each.
One consequence involves how an empirical mooring informs our
understanding of what equal education means. One immediate benefit is that
by resorting to social science evidence as support for the proposition that
state-enforced segregation constitutionally harms black schoolchildren, the
Court made subsequent school desegregation litigation easier by effectively
removing the need to prove individualized harm. On the other hand, by
casting equal education in empirical terms, the Court simultaneously narrowed
the doctrine, diluted the influence of broader notions of justice, and risked
privileging social science evidence over background constitutional values.
A second consequence is institutional and flows from courts' compara-
tive abilities to deploy empirical social science. Here, the benefits from an
empirically moored equal educational opportunity doctrine include providing
courts with a framework to analyze competing interpretations of equal educa-
tion. In addition, social science equips courts with tools (empirical evidence)
similar to those used by policymakers in the legislative and executive
4. KLUGER, supra note 3, at 706.
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branches. However, institutional costs from the courts' use of social science
and empirical evidence include the stresses incident to pushing courts and
judges into relatively unfamiliar intellectual terrain. Use of empirical evi-
dence also uncovers institutional and capacity limitations of the courts' ability
to work with such information.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. In Part II, I develop my central
claim - that the Warren Court contributed to the empiricization of the equal
educational opportunity doctrine. I begin by describing the equal education
doctrine and its development prior to the Warren Court and its decision in
Brown. I then turn to the Brown decision itself, with a particular emphasis on
footnote eleven. As evidence of my claim, the Article then considers three
specific post-Brown education litigation contexts for support: post-Brown
school desegregation litigation, as well as litigation in the school finance and
choice areas. In Part HI, I consider the two main consequences of this particu-
lar Warren Court legacy. The first is how an empirical orientation confines
the equal education doctrine. The second relates to institutional stresses
flowing from courts' increasing use of and reliance on empirical social
science. Finally, in Part IV, I endeavor to place this Warren Court empirical
legacy into a broader jurisprudential context.
1. The Empiricization of Equal Educational Opportunity
A. Equal Educational Opportunity Before Brown
Three general observations frame discussions about the equal educational
opportunity doctrine prior to Brown. First, the list of factors influencing the
equal education doctrine over time is long and not confined at all to the
Warren Court.5 Second, the trend toward increased empiricization in the law
generally, predicted long ago by Justice Holmes,6 began decades prior to the
Brown decision.' Consequently, rather than initiating a change, the Brown
decision accelerated a pre-existing general trend of empiricization. Third,
5. See James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111
YALE L.J. 2043, 2050-58 (2002) (discussing influence of suburbs on equal educational opportu-
nity doctrine).
6. See OLIVER WENDE.LL HOilfEs, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
167, 187 (1920) (predicting influence of "the man of statistics" on law).
7. See generallyJOHNH.ScHEGEL,AMERIcANLEGALREALIsMAND EMPIRICALSOCIAL
SCIENCE (1995) (discussing influence of Legal Realists); Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and
Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decisionmaking and the New Empiricism,
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming). For an example of an early case drawing upon empirical
social science evidence, see Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 n.I (1908). See also Marion
E. Doro, The Brandeis Brief, 11 VAND. L. REv. 783, 792-93 (1958) (noting use of empirical
social science evidence).
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credit for inventing the equal educational opportunity doctrine cannot properly
be assigned to the Warren Court. All three points rein in my argument in
important ways. Specifically, attention to and concerns over the growing
conflation of law and social science as well as equal education predate the
Warren Court.
This final point - that the equal educational opportunity doctrine pre-
dates Brown - warrants discussion. Although a comprehensive historical
account of the equal educational opportunity doctrine's evolution is beyond
the scope of this Article, a brief discussion of some of its highlights is in
order." Pre-Brown case law is one (but not the only) obvious indication of the
focus on the equal education doctrine that preceded the Warren Court. Much
of the important, perhaps critical, work that supplied the precedential founda-
tion upon which Brown rests took place before the Warren Court formally
began in 1953.
1. The Legal Assault on Plessy: From Separate to Equal
The formal legal assault on the separate-but-equal doctrine, infamously
articulated in Plessy v. Ferguson,"0 took place over decades and developed
into a deliberate, systematic - indeed, brilliant - litigation strategy. The initial
assault on the Plessy doctrine focused on its "separate" prong. InMissouri ex
rel. Gaines v. Canada," the State of Missouri sought to meet its constitutional
obligation to provide separate law school opportunities and facilities by
paying for African American Missourians to undertake their legal training at
out-of-state law schools.' 2 The Court disagreed and in 1938 concluded that
the "separate" prong of the separate-but-equal doctrine imposed a duty on
Missouri to provide legal education services within its borders.'" To be sure,
the logic of the Gaines decision kept open the possibility that states could
constitutionally maintain single-race educational institutions.'4 However, the
decision had the practical effect of increasing the cost to states of that possi-
bility. The financial impact of the Gaines decision was distributed unevenly
8. The absence in the research literature of a comprehensive analysis of the equal
education doctrine and its evolution over time is a surprising and significant void.
9. For a brief yet helpful summary and synthesis, see MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCA-
TIONAL PouicY AND THE LAW 367-68 (4th ed. 2002).
10. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
11. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
12. See Missouri exrel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337,352 (1938) (requiring admission
of black students to state university law school, absent provision of separate program).
13. Id. at350.
14. See id. at 349, 351 (confirming option of providing separate programs that are
substantially equal).
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across the states. It did not affect states that had already integrated their
education facilities or constructed dual facilities, at least not immediately.
Others states, however, felt strongly enough about separating the races that
they undertook costly programs to establish separate educational facilities.
Having persuaded the Court to construe the separate-but-equal doctrine
to mean that states had, at the very least, to establish separate educational
facilities, litigants then turned their attention to the Plessy doctrine's "equal"
prong. An important articulation of the Court's understanding of what equal
education meant in this context involved the University of Texas School of
Law. 5 The State of Texas, confronting a non-white Texan applicant and
understanding the implications of the Gaines decision, established a law
school facility for non-white Texas residents. 6 Texas intended the new law
school, housed at the Texas State University for Negroes (at the time, also
located in Austin), to meet its obligation under the already-imploding separate-
but-equal doctrine."
Although the Court in Sweatt v. Painter8 conceded that Texas's in-state
non-white law school was "separate" (thus satisfying the requirement articu-
lated in Gaines), it nevertheless found that the law school was unconstitutional
because it fell short of meeting the Plessy doctrine's "equal" prong.' 9 The
Court's rigorous comparison of Texas's white and non-white law schools in
Sweatt warrants attention. Without resorting to anything resembling formal
social science, the Justices painstakingly compared the physical and non-
physical attributes of the two law schools.2" Delving to a level of nuance
informed by the Justices' first-hand knowledge of and experience with law
schools and legal education, as well as exceptionally detailed amicus briefs,2'
the Court's level and rigor of scrutiny rendered the Plessy doctrine little more
than a feeble shell, at least as it applied to higher education.22
15. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950) (finding that separate non-white law
school was not "equal").
16. More specifically, having found against the University of Texas Law School, a state
trial court gave the university six months to establish a separate but equal law school within the
state for its resident non-white applicants. Id. at 632.
17. Id.
18. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
19. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629,635-36 (1950).
20. Id. at 632-34.
21. See Jonathan L. Entin, Sweatt v. Painter, The End of Segregation, and the Transfor-
mation of Education Law, 5 REV. Lrrio. 3, 42-54, 60-63 (1986) (discussing role of amicus
briefs in Sweatt decision).
22. For a detailed account of the Sweatt litigation, see generally id.
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If the Court staggered the Plessy doctrine with the Sweatt decision, it all
but gutted the Plessy doctrine in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for
Higher Education, ' released on the same day as Sweatt.24 Recognizing the
need to provide in-state educational facilities for non-white residents, as well
as the likely economic futility of establishing two separate in-state educational
facilities, Oklahoma decided to admit whites and non-whites into the same
graduate schools.25 However, within the technically integrated schools,
Oklahoma implemented policies and practices designed to insulate white
students from non-white students, such as McLaurin.2
Just as the Court demonstrated its detailed understanding of legal educa-
tion in Sweatt, in McLaurin the Court revealed a remarkably nuanced under-
standing of the complexities surrounding the more abstract concepts of
learning and the educational experience. The McLaunn opinion acknowl-
edged that a truly broad educational experience involves much more than the
bricks-and-mortar issues associated with physical facilities.27 Rather, the
Court noted that critical educational benefits flow from the free and unfettered
exchange of ideas and interaction among students.28 By insulating white and
non-white students from one another in classrooms, libraries, cafeterias, and
elsewhere, the Court reasoned that the state "handicapped" and "impaired"
McLaurin's ability to receive an education on equal terms, as the Constitution
commands.29 Consequently, the Court ruled that Oklahoma's program did not
comport with the separate-but-equal requirement.3" In so doing, the McLaurin
opinion foreshadowed the outcome in Brown.
2. Non-Judicial Pre-Brown Contributions to Equal
Educational Opportunity
It would be a mistake to assume that only federal courts were engaged in
the desegregation movement that gripped much of the country for decades.
As important as court decisions were to the development of the equal educa-
tional opportunity doctrine, other branches of the federal government, specifi-
cally Congress, participated in shaping the doctrine before the Brown deci-
23. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
24. See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950)
(finding that segregationist graduate school policies denied students equal education).
25. Id. at 639.
26. Id. at 640.
27. Id. at 640-41.
28. Id. at 641.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 642.
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sion. Prior to the twentieth century, the federal government largely remained
in the background. Because of the absence of any express constitutional
mandate" and American education's overwhelmingly local character, Con-
gress's posture in the education sector during the nineteenth century is best
described as passive and reactive. Notwithstanding a tradition of local con-
trol, stresses created by national emergencies - notably war - prompted
Congress to become directly involved in education.
The Morill Act, passed during the Civil War, helped spur scientific,
engineering, and agricultural programs at the college level.32 During World
War I, Congress passed the Smith-Hughes Act, which promoted vocational
education at the elementary and secondary level.33 World War II prompted
passage of the Lanham Act, which sought to blunt the effects of federal
ownership of land on public school finance regimes (which are heavily
dependent upon local property tax bases).34
Moreover, at a more general level, the common school movement of the
nineteenth century also contributed to an emerging national commitment to
education. The common school movement, at least in theory, sought to
embrace "all children" and was viewed as a mechanism by which individuals
could traverse "social classes."35 In addition, state constitutions contributed
by expressly obligating states to educate their citizenry. 6
B. The Warren Court, Equal Educational Opportunity, and Brown
Despite important pre-Brown developments in the equal educational
opportunity doctrine, the Warren Court's imprint on the doctrine is clear. The
shadow cast by the Brown decision over the equal education landscape is wide,
long, and enduring. The opinion's significance remains difficult to overem-
phasize.
31. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1972) ("Education,
of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.
Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.").
32. Morill Act, ch. 130,12 Stat. 503 (1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 301-305,
307, 308 (2000)) ("An Act donating public lands to the several states and territories which may
provide colleges for the benefit of agriculture and mechanical arts.").
33. Smith-Hughes Vocational Education Act, ch. 114, 39 Stat. 929 (1917) (repealed
1997).
34. Lanham Act, ch. 862, 54 Stat. 1125 (1940) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1521-1524 (1994)).
35. DAVID B. TYACKET AL., LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBIUC EDUCATION, 1785-1954,
at 16 (1987).
36. Id. at 18.
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Although at one level the Brown decision addresses 'and fundamentally
shapes the equal education doctrine, the decision's reach extends much further
and to many other levels. To many, the Brown decision is canonical and
functions as a quasi-Rorschach test for legal theorists and the general public
alike.37 Brown is easily one of the most important legal decisions of the second
half of the twentieth century, if not the most important decision. At least one
commentator opined that the Brown opinion was "assuredly the most important
litigation of any kind in any court since the Civil War."3 Aside from Roe v.
Wade,39 Miranda v. Arizona,4 ° and Marbury v. Madison,41 few decisions
penetrate more deeply and reveal more about one's thoughts on such funda-
mental questions as the proper role of the courts in our constitutional structure
than Brown.42 Brown is often invoked as a litmus test for theories of constitu-
tional interpretation. Not surprisingly, as Professor Balkin explains, no theory
of constitutional law is deemed sound if it cannot explain and justify the result
reached in Brown.43
Although few quibble with Brown's overall importance as a legal deci-
sion, as well as the obvious "correctness" of the outcome,44 Brown stands for
different things to different people. To some, the Brown decision articulates
critical constitutional norms of justice and fairness. Some point to the Brown
decision as triggering the civil rights movement.45 Others argue that it both
embodies and advances the nation's "public values."46 Even some of Brown's
supporters, however, find some cause for concern. Some find the opinion
37. Jack M. Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN v BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD
HAVE SAID 3, 8, 12 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
38. Louis H. Pollak, ThurgoodMarshall: Lawyer and Justice, 40 MD. L. REV. 405, 406
(1981).
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
41. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
42. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973) (finding statute restricting abortion
to be unconstitutional); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-74 (1966) (requiring warning
upon arrest and questioning); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179-80 (1803)
(establishing power of judicial review). It is conceivable that the recent decision in Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), might warrant inclusion on this list. At this early juncture, however,
not enough time has passed to assess its impact accurately.
43. Jack M. Balkin, Preface to WHAT BROWN v. BOARD OFEDUCATION SHOULD HAVE
SAID ix, x-xi (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
44. Balkin, supra note 37, at 4.
45. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS iN THE COURTS: HoW A DEDICATED BAND OF
LAWYERS FOUGHTFOR THE CrviLRIGHTS REVOLUTION 12 (1994) (tracing civil rights movement
to early decisions including Brown).
46. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreward: The Forms of Justice,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2,9, 14,29-30 (1979).
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worrisome because it seems to "abandon the new religion of judicial restraint
all too easily."47 To others, like legal historian Lucas Powe, Jr., it reflects the
imposition of northern values upon the South.' Still others, notably Herbert
Wechsler, have argued that the decision reached a result that neutral principles
could not support.49
Despite questions about the structural integrity of its legal reasoning,
Brown's status as an American icon remains secure.5° Rather than dwell on the
well-trod litany of legacies that can properly be assigned to Brown, I will focus
instead on the discrete collision between the equal educational opportunity
doctrine and empirical social science that the Brown decision marks.
As both history and law failed to provide an unambiguous legal rationale
for the Court's rejection of the separate-but-equal doctrine, the Court turned
to empirical social science." By boldly declaring that "separate is inherently
unequal" in Brown, 2 the Warren Court recast the equal educational opportu-
nity doctrine in a fundamental way by making it clear that equality transcends,
and was no longer partitionable along, racial lines. Although the Court re-
solved the issue of dejure segregation at the constitutional level in Brown, the
larger task of actually increasing school integration remained (and still re-
mains) an unfinished project.5 3
Along with what the Court decided in Brown, how the Court crafted its
argument also matters. In an effort to make its opinion as accessible and non-
accusatory as possible, the Warren Court set out to write a brief, uncompli-
cated opinion.54 Consistent with this goal, the Court's core argument in Brown
is remarkably brief, especially given the magnitude of the stakes involved."
47. Id. at 15.
48. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN PouTcs 34 (2000).
49. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 31-34 (1959) (criticizing Brown opinion in terms of legal theory). But see Charles L.
Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,421 (1960) (arguing
that correctness of Brown decision is obvious).
50. Balkin, supra note 37, at 25.
51. Joseph P. Viteritti, A Truly Living Constitution: Why Educational Opportunity
Trumps Strict Separation on the Voucher Question, 57 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 89, 93-94 (2000).
52. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. Notably, the Court declined to overrule Plessy expressly,
choosing instead to leave it dangling in the proverbial wind.
53. Unfortunately, data describing the extent of the nation's engagement with school
desegregation are scarce. For a discussion, see Michael Heise, Assessing the Efficacy of School
Desegregation, 46 SYR. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (1996).
54. KLUGER, supra note 3, at 706; see also Jack M. Balkin, The History of the Brown
Litigation, in WHAT BROwv v BOARD O1 EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 29, 34-35 (Jack M.
Balkin ed., 2001) (stating that Chief Justice Warren made Brown opinion short and accessible
in order to place authority of Court behind it).
55. Of course, it could be persuasively argued that the argument and entire opinion were
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A single sentence distills the Court's argument: "To separate [schoolchildren]
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. 56 Having
advanced a psychological argument in support of its conclusion of constitu-
tional harm, the Court referenced with favor a lower court finding that linked
state-enforced segregation with the psychological harms. 7
Chief Justice Warren then sought to push the Court's psychological
argument even further by rooting it in social science research and noting that
"this finding is amply supported by modem authority.""8  Consistent with
traditional legal research and writing and prevailing (and present) norms,
Chief Justice Warren then dropped a footnote, the famous footnote eleven,
which cites to a list of social science sources for authority for the psychologi-
cal harm proposition.59
Notwithstanding the Brown decision itself, particularly its elegant yet
forceful exposition of the equal educational opportunity doctrine, footnote
eleven recasts the doctrine by mooring it in social science. In so doing, the
Warren Court not only influenced the future of equal education, but also
accelerated a building trend toward greater incorporation of social science
evidence into legal theory by lawyers, judges, and courts. By using social
science to construe equal education, Chief Justice Warren believed that the
Court would not appear to be browbeating or morally condemning the South
as a region or those who practiced state-enforced segregation. At least that
was one outcome he sought. Despite the best of intentions, it is generally
understood that his strategy famously backfired.60 The effort to lubricate
public acceptance of the outcome in Brown with a non-accusatory tone
generated costs. When measured in terms of criticism, these costs were
significant.
Although the Court's opinion endeavored to minimize controversy
(perhaps a futile goal), it arrived immediately. Amid the expected and unex-
pected cacophony, footnote eleven attracted particular attention. Critics
remarkably brief precisely because the magnitude of the stakes involved was so large.
56. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
57. See id. (quoting unreported findings of lower court in Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 98 F.
Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951)). Other descriptions of the harms included: "[L]essening of
motivation, alienation of the child from the educational institution, distortion of personal
relationships, and various forms of antisocial behavior." Owen M. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in
the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564, 569 (1965).
58. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
59. Id.at494n.11.
60. See Balkin, supra note 54, at 35 (stating that "even with a unanimous opinion
southern politicians ridiculed the decision and resisted it in every imaginable way").
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quickly focused on technical aspects of the social science used in Dr. Clark's
study. They found much to work with because, at bottom, Dr. Clark's study
involved little more than asking a few African American children to choose
from an assortment of white and black dolls."' When the African American
schoolchildren indicated that the white dolls were "nicer," Dr. Clark con-
cluded that the children lacked adequate self-esteem.62 The Court latched onto
this finding and identified state-sponsored school segregation as its cause.63
Observers characterize as "astonishing" that Dr. Clark's studies provided
the foundation upon which rests "the most profound decision handed down by
the Supreme Court in an entire century."' Some recoiled from the implication
of psychology's seeming usurpation of law;6 others from the underlying
social science evidence itself. Although the methodological mechanics of Dr.
Clark's test are generally well-known, a few points bear emphasis. Dr.
Clark's studies were a rather "primitive" exercise of empirical social science.
6
As Professor Viteritti notes, the study was limited by a small sample size and
the absence of anything resembling a control group.67 Even more problematic
was the finding that African American children in northern states without
segregation were even more likely to prefer white dolls than African Amer-
ican children attending state-segregated schools in the South.' This finding,
of course, casts severe doubt on the presumed causal link between state-
sponsored segregation and the psychological harm advanced in the Brown
litigation. Potentially even more devastating was the inference that the result
in Brown depended on what social science the decision cited. If that was the
case, the implications for the result, had the social science evidence at the time
not been positive, are unimaginable. Finally, the reliance on social science
evidence in footnote eleven has not weathered the test of time well. Indeed,
most constitutional scholars today basically eschew this particular path taken
by Chief Justice Warren.69
61. POWE, supra note 48, at 43.
62. Id.
63. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n. 11.
64. Viteritti, supra note 51, at 94.
65. See J. HARVIE WILKINSON M, FROM BROWN To BAru THE SUPREME CouRT AND
SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 33 (1979) (describing negative reaction to Brown in
which critics questioned whether decision was matter of law or social science).
66. POWE, supra note 48, at 42-43.
67. Viteritti, supra note 51, at 94.
68. POWE, supra note 48, at 43.
69. See Jack M. Balkin, Rewriting Brown, in WHAT BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION
SHOULD HAVE SAID 44, 52 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (stating that many scholars disagree with
Chief Justice Warren's reliance on social science evidence). In an interesting "thought experi-
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To be sure, even if the Warren Court's reliance on empirical social
science evidence failed to soften the opinion's tone, it nevertheless possessed
some other benefits. First, Chief Justice Warren's desire - however futile it
might appear in hindsight - to do everything possible to facilitate the nation's
acceptance of a decision involving issues that continue to shape the nation's
character succeeded in framing the intersection of race and education. Sec-
ond, the reliance on empirical evidence produced practical, strategic benefits.
By relying on Dr. Clark's work, the Court made it possible to circumvent the
traditional need to establish particularized harm to specific children at individ-
ual schools. ° According to Dr. Clark, "the assumption of inequality could
now be made wherever segregation existed."71 From the perspective of those
seeking to use the courts to desegregate public schools, this aspect of the
decision held enormous appeal. Given the opinion's magnitude, it is far from
unreasonable to conclude that the benefits exceeded the costs.
C. Evidence of the Warren Court's Empirical Legacy
An assertion, like mine, that the Warren Court through the Brown opin-
ion empiricized the equal educational opportunity doctrine, demands proof.
A review of all three major litigation efforts seeking to structurally enhance
educational opportunity since Brown - post-Brown school desegregation,
school finance, and school choice - reveals the influence of empirical social
science on equal education litigation.
1. Post-Brown School Desegregation Litigation: The Role
of Demographics and Student Achievement
Although the school desegregation context quickly evolved following
Brown, social science retained a role. Paradoxically, as criticism of its use in
ment," Professor Jack Balkin gathered eight other constitutional law scholars to "re-write" the
Brown opinion in 2000. (Participants included: Professors Bruce Ackerman, Jack Balkin,
Derrick Bell, Drew Days II, John Hart Ely, Catherine MacKinnon, Michael McConnell, Frank
Michelman, and Cass Sunstein.) As Balkin notes, most declined to rely on empirical social
science evidence as proof of the unconstitutionality of state-segregated schools. Id. Although
Professor Ely relied upon the notion of psychological harm, he did not cite to the sources
identified in footnote eleven. Id. Professor MacKinnon accepted the social science evidence
relied upon in Brown, though she interpreted the evidence quite differently than did Chief
Justice Warren. Id.
70. See Kenneth B. Clark, The Social Scientists, the Brown Decision, and Contemporary
Confusion, in ARGW : TBE ORAL ARGLMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT INBROWN V.
BoARD o EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55, at xxxi, xxxvii (Leon Friedman ed., 1969) (stating
that "social scientists made it possible to avoid the need to obtain proof of individual damage").
71. Id.
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legal decisions increased, so did the prominence of empirical social science
in courts.7 2
Shifts in legal strategy responded as well to the dynamic nature of school
desegregation litigation. Three major events shaped post-Brown school
desegregation litigation. One was the effort by southern public school districts
to thwart the Brown decision. 3 The Court's patience with these tactics was
not unlimited. The Court's frustration came through in Green v. County
School Board ofNew Kent County74 when the Court ordered the school district
to "come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises
realistically to work now."" In 1971, the Court displayed its level of commit-
ment by approving a plan to bus students within a district to achieve greater
integration in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education.7"
Second, at the same time that the courts were wrestling with southern
school districts, the school desegregation litigants turned their attention to
northern school districts. Unlike their southern counterparts, litigants in the
North could not point to formal state policies expressly segregating public
schools. Rather, the causes of school segregation in the North were more
complex and interrelated." Much of the school desegregation focus following
Brown shifted to concerns about de facto (and away from de jure) school
segregation.
A third event, and perhaps the single most important event shaping post-
Brown school desegregation litigation, was the Court's Milliken v. Bradley"8
decision in 1974. InMilliken, the Court prohibited a metropolitan-wide busing
plan that crossed school district boundaries.79 More precisely, the Court
refused to sanction interdistrict relief absent an interdistrict liability."0 The
consequences to most American cities included the demographic reality that
urban public schools would remain overwhelmingly non-white.81
72. CHESLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 24.
73. See, e.g., HAROLDW. HoRowrrz&KENNETHL. KARST, LAW, LAWYERS, AND SOCIAL
CHANGE 239-40 (1969) (noting glacial pace of school integration in South); Alexander Bickel,
The Decade ofSchoolDesegregation: Progress and Prospects, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 193 (1964)
(describing various ways southern school districts thwarted Brown).
74. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
75. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430,439 (1968).
76. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971) (affirming
district court desegregation order).
77. For a helpful description, see generally GARY ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? (1978); U.S.
COmm'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBuC SCHOOLS (1967).
78. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
79. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752-53 (1974).
80. Id. at 745.
81. For a discussion about how the Milliken decision fits into a broader social context,
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The shift from a dejure to defacto school desegregation strategy necessi-
tated a change in the asserted harm. The harm in Brown, psychological dam-
age flowing from state-sponsored desegregation, was no longer apt. In its
place, litigants considered the cognitive harms to students flowing from
racially isolated schools. Social scientists responded likewise and, as a conse-
quence, continued to contribute to the litigation effort. Indeed, the magnitude
of social science's role increased as defendant school districts, having realized
its import, began marshaling their own empirical rebuttal evidence. 2
Efforts to disentangle the complicated interactions between race and
student achievement confronted substantial methodological hurdles. If trying
to figure out which variables influence student academic. achievement was not
difficult enough, derivative efforts to tease out the unique influence of racially-
identifiable schools proved even more difficult. Further, many courts grappled
with evidence seeking to assess the potential benefits of mandatory and volun-
tary school desegregation, as well as the differences between the two ap-
proaches. Not surprisingly, the scholarly literature offers few clear answers. 3
A district court's decision inHobson v. Hansen4 evidences many of the
post-Brown changes in school desegregation litigation. The case also provides
a glimpse into the scope and limits of empirical evidence as well as its role in
litigation.85 In Hobson, the court admitted into evidence multiple sets of
competing regression analyses endeavoring to document the extent and ill-
effects of segregated public schools in the District of Columbia. 6 However,
because both sides mounted complex and conflicting empirical testimonies,
Judge Wright grew frustrated at its density or indeterminacy, or both.87 As a
consequence, the court was "forced back to its own common sense approach
to a problem which, though admittedly complex, has certainly been made more
obscure than was necessary. ''88
see Ryan & Heise, supra note 5, at 2046.
82. For a thorough treatment of this point, see CHESLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 9.
83. For an extensive compilation of the social science evidence, and related debates, on
the relations between school desegregation and student achievement, see YUDOF ET AL., supra
note 9, at 410-13.
84. 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971).
85. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POuCY 107 (1977).
86. Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844, 850 (D.D.C. 1971). For a detailed description
of the empirical studies conducted for and considered by the courts in the Hobson litigation, see
HOROWITZ, supra note 85, at 125-46. See also Hobson, 327 F. Supp. at 850 (stating that
"figures speak and when they do, courts listen" (quoting Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 9 (5th Cir.
1966))).
87. Observers concluded that the empirical evidence was "inconclusive." HORowrrz,
supra note 85, at 145.
88. Hobson, 327 F. Supp. at 859.
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As previously discussed, efforts to racially integrate the nation's major
urban public school systems came to an abrupt halt in 1974 after the Court's
Milliken decision. 9 Recognizing the demographic realities confronting many
urban school districts and the logic of the Brown decision two decades earlier,
courts shifted their remedial strategy from a focus on integration to supplemen-
tal funding intended to offset the deleterious academic consequences of
racially-identifiable schools. The Court's decision inMilliken 1190 signals this
subtle yet critical change. In exchange for a decision (Milliken) that all but
precludes anything remotely resembling an integrated educational environment
for Detroit schoolchildren, the Court inMilliken II decided that the compensa-
tory educational programs mandated by the district court were aptly tailored
to address and remedy the educational consequences of the constitutional
violation.91 In addition to reshaping school desegregation litigation, the
Milliken 1I decision signals the transition of equal education litigation's focus
from race to resources. 2 That school finance litigation eclipsed desegregation
litigation93 during this period is simply emblematic of this transition in litiga-
tion focus.
2. School Finance Litigation
Frustration with the slow and uneven pace of school desegregation,
coupled with the implications of the Milliken decision, helped prompt school
finance litigation. Advocates hoped that by attacking funding inequalities,
89. But see Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1337 (Conn. 1996) (requiring action to
desegregate schools in Hartford). For a helpful discussion of the Sheff decision, see generally
James E. Ryan, Shet Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529
(1999).
90. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,290 (1977) [hereinafter Milliken II].
91. Id.
92. For more on this transition, see, for example, Michael Heise, Equal Educational
Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An Empiri-
cal Perspective and Alternative Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543, 554-58 (1998) [hereinafter
Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity] (arguing that Milliken Irs conflation of race and
resources broadened equal educational opportunity doctrine and was forerunner to school
finance litigation); Michael Heise, The Courts v. Educational Standards, 120 PUB. INT. 55, 62
(1995) (discussing school finance litigation); James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School
Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV. 432, 477 (1999) ("Put more crudely, the [NAACP's]
strategy was based on the notion that green follows white, and that black students would receive
more educational resources if placed in white schools.").
93. Today, the most active aspect of school desegregation involves unwinding court
orders and districts seeking unitary status. See Gary Orfield & David Thronson, Dismantling
Desegregation: Uncertain Gains, Unexpected Costs, 42 EMORY L.J. 759,788 (1993) (criticiz-
ing courts for granting school districts' petitions for unitary status).
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they would be able to equalize education by improving opportunities for poor
and minority students. Like desegregation proponents, early school finance
proponents advanced a "tying" strategy. Whereas school desegregation sought
to tie the fate of white and black students together by placing them in the same
schools, school finance equalization would tie the fate of poor and wealthy
schools together by ensuring equal access to resources.94
a. Successive "Waves" of School Finance Lawsuits
At the federal level, the Supreme Court put an early end to school finance
litigation in the federal courts, ruling in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez95 that unequal school funding schemes do not violate the
United States Constitution.96 Despite the early blow it inflicted, Rodriguez
served to redirect school finance litigants to state constitutions, state education
clauses, and state courts, where they have experienced mixed results. Since
1974, litigants have challenged the finance schemes in over forty states, and
almost twenty state supreme courts have declared their respective school
funding programs unconstitutional.'
The initial wave of school finance lawsuits principally sought equaliza-
tion of resources." A second wave focused on state education clauses." A
third wave, launched in 1989, is moored in adequacy-based challenges." °
Most litigants now contend not that all students are entitled to the same re-
sources, but rather that all students should receive the funds necessary to
finance an adequate education.' Although much has been and could be said
about these cases," 2 one feature bears emphasis. One thread that joins school
94. Sources for this paragraph include Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, supra note
92, at 553-57; James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 259-60 (1999);
Ryan, supra note 89, at 563-64.
95. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
96. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
97. For descriptions of, and citations to, the cases, see Ryan, supra note 94, at 266-69
nn.70-86.
98. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 121-42 (1995) (reviewing history of school finance cases);
Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave": From
Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1152-53 (1995) (distinguishing between "equity"
and "adequacy" in school finance).
99. See id. at 1157-62 (reviewing school finance decisions based on state constitutions).
100. See id. at 1162-66 (explaining adequacy-based litigation).
101. See Ryan, supra note 94, at 268-69 (describing shift in theories and pointing out that
not all cases since 1989 have shifted from equity to adequacy claims).
102. For an excellent overview of the cases and discussion of the commentary, see Enrich,
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finance lawsuits throughout all three waves is the use of empirical evidence to
inform the meaning of equal educational opportunity, here construed in terms
of finances.
b. The Role ofMoney
For many involved in educational reform policy debates, including school
finance debates, the ultimate barometer of success or failure is academic
achievement.'0° To be sure, an explanation for why some students perform
well and others perform poorly is endlessly debated in the literature." 4 These
enormously important debates aside, a core assumption upon which school
finance litigation pivots is that school funding and student achievement
correlate. The lingering dispute over whether money "matters" is noted for its
technical complexities and endurance."°'
Two major studies, both by Professor Coleman, stimulated the general
controversy. In the first, Coleman and colleagues considered whether school
spending influences student achievement. In 1966, Coleman released a
supra note 98, at 166-83.
103. See, e.g., Henry M. Levin, Educational Vouchers: Effectiveness, Choice, and Costs,
17 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MoM'T. 373,374 (1998) ("Because student achievement is considered
to be a universal goal of schools, it has become the sine qua non for evaluating school reform.").
104. See, e.g., JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 304 (1966) (finding that "an impressive percent of
variance [in verbal achievement] is accounted for by student body characteristics"). Scores of
subsequent studies have confirmed Coleman's conclusion. See generally RICHARD D.
KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC
SCHOOL CHOICE 26-28, 86-90 (2001) (discussing research findings relating to good teachers,
class size, and parental involvement); Ryan, supra note 94, at 287 n.167.
105. For articles generally skeptical of a correlation between educational spending and
educational opportunity, see ERIC A. HANUSHEK ET AL., MAKING SCHOOLS WORK: IMPROVING
PERFORMANCE AND CONTROLLING COSTS (1994); ALLAN R. ODDEN & LAWRENCE 0. Picus,
SCHOOL FINANCE: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE 277-81 (1992); Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of
Public Provision, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1185, 1213-14 (1996); Eric A. Hanushek, Money Might
Matter Somewhere: A Response to Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald, EDUC. RESEARCHER, May
1994, at 5; Eric A. Hanushek, The Impact ofDifferentialExpenditures on School Performance,
EDUC. RESEARCHER, May 1989, at 45; Eric A. Hanushek, Throwing Money at Schools, I J.
POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 19 (1981); Eric A. Hanushek, O'hen School Finance "Reform" May
Not Be Good Policy, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423 (1991). For articles generally supportive of a
correlation between expenditures and educational opportunity, see Christopher F. Edley, Jr.,
Lawyers andEducation Reform, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 293 (1991); Ronald F. Ferguson, Paying
for Public Education: New Evidence on How and Why Money Matters, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
465 (1991); Larry V. Hedges et al., Does Money Matter? A Meta-Analysis of Studies of the
Effects ofDifferential School Inputs on Student Outcomes, EDUC. RESEARCHER, April 1994, at
5.
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mammoth and controversial report on the nation's schools, which concluded
that family influence matters the most in determining student achievement,
followed by the socioeconomic status of the student's classmates." ° One
central finding bears directly on a key assumption underpinning school
finance litigation: what mattered very little, he concluded, was school spend-
ing."°  Although scores of social scientists continue to debate the latter
proposition about the influence of spending,"" a remarkable consensus has
formed on the point that the socioeconomic status of one's peers matters a
great deal.1" Indeed, numerous subsequent studies confirm that "the social
composition of the student body is more highly related to achievement,
independent of the student's own social background, than is any other school
factor.""'  Notably, education commentators of every stripe acknowledge the
strength and consistency of these findings.' Simply put, "[i]f there is one
thing that is more related to a child's academic achievement than coming from
a poor household, it is going to school with children from other poor house-
holds.""' 2 Significant by omission is a similar consensus on how school
funding influences student achievement.
In addition to exploring the larger question of whether money matters in
terms of student achievement, scholars have compared results from schools
that spend different amounts on their students. Again, research by Professor
106. See COLEMAN ET. AL, supra note 104, at 298-305 (discussing impact of several
variables on student achievement).
107. See id. at 21-22, 296-97, 312-16 (assessing impact of school expenditures on
achievement).
108. See supra note 105 (surveying literature discussing educational spending and
educational opportunity).
109. See GARY ORFILD & SusAN EATON, DISMANTIJNG DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN v BOARD OF EDUCATION 53 (1996) (stating that powerful influence of
socioeconomic status of peers on student achievement is "one of the most consistent findings
in research on education").
110. Ryan & Heise, supra note 5, at 2105 (citing James S. Coleman, Toward Open
Schools, 9 PuB. INT. 20 (Fall 1967)). For discussion of the numerous studies confirming this
point, see KAHLENBERG, supra note 104, at 26-28.
111. See KAHLENERG, supra note 104, at 37 (stating that "money is not the only issue that
determines inequality. A more important factor, I am convinced, is the makeup of the student
enrollment, who is sitting next to you in class" (quoting Interview by Ted Koppel with Jonathan
Kozol, Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 17, 1992))); Chester E. Finn, Jr., Education
That Works: Make the Schools Compete, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1987, at 63 (acknowl-
edging that "disadvantaged children [tend] to learn more when they attend[] school with middle-
class youngsters").
112. Trine Tsouderos, Schools Out of Balance, TENNESSEAN, Dec. 27, 1998, at IA
(quoting James Guthrie).
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Coleman remains at the heart of the ongoing scholarly debate." 3 Professor
Coleman (along with several colleagues) published the first major quantitative
study exploring differences in student achievement between public and private
(principally Catholic) schools. Coleman and his colleagues found that stu-
dents in private schools performed slightly better, after controlling for student
race and socioeconomic background." 4 What makes the comparison espe-
cially important for the school finance debate is that most inner-city private
schools (specifically, parochial schools) spend less on a per-pupil basis than
their public school counterparts." 5 The policy implications of private schools
that spend less yet perform better are obvious and significant. These findings,
not surprisingly, attracted criticism" 6 as well as stimulated further research.'l 7
c. How Courts in School Finance Lawsuits Treat the Role of Money
While academics continue to debate the relation between school funding
and student academic achievement, judges continue to decide school finance
cases. Interestingly, no doubt because of the question's wicked complexities,
courts have split over the existence of a connection between school funding
and student achievement. On the one hand, the United States Supreme Court
described the asserted link between school spending and educational opportu-
nity as "unsettled and disputed.""' On the other hand, commentators have
noted that more than half of the state supreme courts that have confronted the
same question have reached the opposite conclusion." 9 Perhaps even more
113. For a helpful summary of Professor Coleman's thirty-five years of research in the
education policy area, see Richard D. Kahlenberg, Learningfrom James Coleman, 144 PUB.
INT. 54, 55-58 (2001).
114. See JAMES S. COLEMANETAL.,HIGHSCHOOLACHIEVEMENT: PUBIC,CATHOUIC, AND
PRIVATE ScHooLs COMPARED 179-85 (1982) (comparing achievement levels in public and
private schools).
115. Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism andModern Church-State Relations, 33 Loy. U.
CIm. L.J. 121,165 (2001).
116. See, e.g., Arthur S. Goldberger & Glen G. Cain, The Causal Analysis of Cognitive
Outcomes in the Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore Report, 55 Soc. OF EDUc. 103, 119-21 (1982)
(criticizing Coleman et al. study for flaws in sampling, research design, and sample bias).
117. See, e.g., Adam Gamoran, Student Achievement in Public Magne4 Public Compre-
hensive, and Private City High Schools, 18 EDuc. EVAL. & PoL'Y ANALYSiS 1, 14 (1996)
(finding no advantage for secular private schools); Caroline M. Hoxby, The Effects of Private
School Vouchers on Schools and Students, in HOLDING SCHOOLS ACCOUNTABLE 177, 177-208
(Helen F. Ladd ed., 1996) (finding advantage for private schools).
118. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1973).
119. See, e.g., John Dayton, Correlating Expenditures and Educational Opportunity in
School Funding Litigation: The Judicial Perspective, 19 J. EDUC. FiN. 167, 178 (1993)
(describing state court responses to asserted positive correlation between educational funding
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startling is the confidence expressed by courts in reaching a conclusion on this
issue, especially in light of the acknowledged uncertainty within the social
science community. 2 °
3. School Choice Litigation
From one perspective, school choice - both public and private - arcs
backward to school desegregation and school finance.' To be sure, school
choice is nascent by comparison and is capable of promoting goals, such as
increased liberty and efficiency, which have little to do with equal educational
opportunity.' 2 Nevertheless, it is fair to say that school choice represents the
latest major attempt to restructure public education in order to equalize oppor-
tunities among students. As a policy, school choice seeks to enhance equality
by granting poorer students a greater opportunity to choose their own schools -
an opportunity that is now principally reserved for wealthier students.'
School choice programs come in four main varieties: intra- and
interdistrict public school choice, charter schools, and voucher plans.'24
Although the least consequential in terms of the number of students presently
served, publicly funded school voucher programs receive the most attention
and opportunity).
120. For a fuller treatment of this point, see Michael Heise, Schoolhouses, Courthouses
andStatehouses: EducationalFinance, Constitutional Structure, and the Separation ofPowers
Doctrine, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 281,291-93 (1998).
121. For more explication of this point, see Ryan & Heise, supra note 5, at 2050-62.
122. See JOHNE. CHUBB& TERRYM. MOE, POLITIcS, MARKETS, &AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
185-229 (1990) (making efficiency-based argument in favor of school choice); see also JEFFREY
R. HENIG, RETHINKING SCHOOL CHOICE: IaMITS OF THE MARKET METAPHOR 57 (1994)
(describing theory that school choice will force schools "to increase the quality of education and
the efficiency with which they deliver it, or else risk going out of business").
123. Some school choice advocates base their arguments in favor of choice on precisely
this point. See generally JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, SCHOLARSHIPS FOR
CHIMDREN(1992); JOSEPHP. VITER-rT CHOOSINGEQUALrY: SCHOOLCHOICE, THE CONSTITU-
TION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY (1999). Notably, it is political conservatives - not typically known
for supporting efforts to ensure equality between the poor and the wealthy - who often advocate
school choice as a means of assuring that poor and middle-class parents have similar choices.
See KAHLENbERG, supra note 104, at 148 (summarizing conservative arguments in favor of
school choice). William Bennett, for example, argues that "poor parents ought to be able to
make the same kinds of choices that middle-class parents make for their children." Id.
124. For purposes of discussion I will ignore the most significant form of "school choice":
the choice of school exercised by individuals when selecting a place to live. For a helpful
discussion of residential school choice, see Jeffrey R. Henig & Stephen D. Sugarman, The
Nature andExtent ofSchool Choice, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY: POLITICS,
POLICY, AND LAW 13, 14-17 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999).
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from policymakers and courts.'25 Three limited programs have been created
in the last decade, in Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Florida.1 2 All three pro-
grams provide vouchers that can be used at private schools, including reli-
gious schools.127 Because voucher plans pose the most significant structural
threat to the existing educational establishment and receive a disproportionate
amount of public, judicial, and scholarly attention, my discussion focuses on
this choice genre.
Not surprisingly, publicly funded voucher programs have attracted
sustained litigation since their inception. The Supreme Court recently an-
swered one long-debated question when it concluded that Cleveland's school
voucher program did not offend the Constitution's Establishment Clause. 2"
However, Simmons-Harris v. Zelman29 leaves open numerous other legal
questions raised by voucher programs. How voucher programs implicate the
125. For a more expansive discussion of the four major types of school choice programs,
see Ryan & Heise, supra note 5, at 2063-78.
126. Much has been written about these plans. For a basic description of all three, see
TERRY M. MOE, SCHooLs, VOuCHERs, AND TIE AMERCAN PUBLIC 36-38 (2001); Henig &
Sugarman, supra note 124, at 26-28; see also VrrEr, supra note 124, at 98-113 (discussing
Milwaukee and Cleveland plans). In addition to these programs, Maine and Vermont provide
money for students in rural districts too small to run their own schools to attend private schools,
and many states pay the costs of at least some disabled students to attend private schools.
Stephen D. Sugarman, School Choice and Public Funding, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL
CoNTRoVERsy: POLITIcs, POLICY, AND LAW 111, 128-29 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R.
Kemerer eds., 1999). Although the Vermont and Maine plans have caught the attention of
voucher supporters, id. at 128, vouchers for students in districts too small to run schools, like
payments to private schools for disabled students, are tangential to the general battle over
vouchers, and we treat them accordingly.
127. Henig & Sugarman, supra note 124, at 26-28. For discussion of the various legal
challenges that have been filed against the programs, see Alison Frankel, Blackboard Jungle:
On the Way to a Supreme Court Test Case with the School Voucher Litigation Road Show,
AMERICAN LAWYER, May 2000, at 64, 68.
128. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 536 U.S. 639, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2473 (2002). For
commentary on the Zelman decision, see generally James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, Taking
School Choice to the Suburbs, WASH. POST, July 3,2002, at A16. Academic commentary on
the general question conceming the constitutionality of the voucher programs - and related
questions - is substantial. For a helpful summary of the constitutional issues raised, see Jesse
H. Choper, Federal Constitutional Issues, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY:
POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW 235, 235-36 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds.,
1999). For citations to the some of the academic commentary, see generally KAHLENBERG,
supra note 104; SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY: POLiTICS, POLICY, AND LAW
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999); Michael Heise, School Choice,
Educational Policy, and Legal Theory: Uncomfortable yet Inevitable Intersections, I U. CHI.
POL'Y REv. 79 (1997).
129. 536 U.S. 639, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
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equal opportunity doctrine as well as their intersection with empirical social
science remain key issues.
In policy debates surrounding the school choice issue, claims rooted in
social science continue to swirl. Similar to the school desegregation and
finance contexts, these claims have migrated from social science circles into
courts assessing school choice policies. Empirical evidence on the actual or
potential benefits of school choice, especially when private schools are in-
volved, remains the subject of searing debate.130 Despite vigorous claims
advanced by both sides of the debate surrounding the constitutionality of
publicly funded voucher programs, the Court in Zelman had before it much of
the contested social science evidence. 3' Disputes and controversies aside,
school choice's intersection with social science pivots on three critical points:
integration, competitive effects, and student achievement.
a. Integration
Although school choice policies have been used to integrate rather than
to segregate schools since the 1970s,32 Professor Levin and others speculate
that school choice would nonetheless result in jeopardizing decades of school
integration efforts, fuel increased socioeconomic stratification, and thereby
exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, social inequities.'33 This argument pivots
on a belief that if more families are empowered to choose among education
options, families who are the most well informed, motivated, and economically
well-off are more likely to avail themselves of greater school choice.'34 Even
130. See Jeffrey R. Henig, School Choice Outcomes, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL
CoNTRovERsY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW 68,97-101 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R.
Kemerer eds., 1999) (noting that increased data has not reduced debate).
131. Non-parties presented much of the contested social science evidence to the Court
through the more than thirty amicus briefs that they filed. For a listing of the briefs filed in the
Zelman case, see Institute for Justice, School Choice Facts, at http'//www.ij.org/cases/
school/facts/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
132. See, e.g., HENIG, supra note 122, at 111 (discussing "controlled choice" plans);
KAHLENBERG, supra note 104, at 116-30 (same); VrERnir, supra note 123, at 58-60 (same).
133. Betsy Levin, Race and School Choice, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTRO-
VERsY: POLITICS, Poucy, AND LAW 266,286 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds.,
1999); see also Molly S. McUsic, The Law's Role in the Distribution of Education: The
Promise and Pifalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SiX STRATE-
GIESFORPROMOTINGEDUCATIONALEQUrrY 88,125-28 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999) (arguing that
competition will result in greater class and racial segregation and stratification); Martha Minow,
ReformingSchoolReform, 68 FORDHAML. REV. 257, 282-83 (1999) (same); Amy S. Wells, The
Sociology ofSchool Choice: Why Some Win and Others Lose in the Educational Marketplace,
in SCHOOL CHOICE: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE 29,29-48 (Edith Rassell & Richard Rothstein
eds., 1993) (same).
134. See PETER W. COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE 91-93 (1994) (discussing school choice
1331
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1309 (2002)
choice proponents recognize the salience of the "skimming problem" as well
as the need for policymakers to address this problem when crafting choice
programs.1
35
A few key factors frame discussions about the possible impact of school
choice policies on integration levels. First, as demographic statistics make
clear, race and income differences segregate schools today. 36 This result
reflects the combination of residential segregation137 and neighborhood school
assignment policies. Urban school districts principally serve poor, minority
students. In addition, most minority students attend urban schools. Second,
most of the publicly and privately funded voucher programs are structured so
that eligible low-income children assigned to struggling urban school districts
generally are confined to alternative schools physically located in the urban
area. To put the point more directly, most voucher programs are designed to
protect the ability of suburbs to control their schools. Both factors - the
existing demographic profile of urban public schools and the structure of
existing voucher programs - interact in a manner that substantially reduces the
likelihood that voucher programs will dramatically alter racial and socioeco-
nomic integration levels. 1
38
However, despite these significant structural barriers, emerging data are
at worst mixed and at best hopeful about the prospects - admittedly small - for
choice programs to increase school racial and socioeconomic integration.
Specifically, data from evaluations of the voucher programs in Milwaukee and
Cleveland reveal that program participants are in more integrated school
settings than are their non-voucher counterparts who remain in public
schools.'39 These findings are due principally to the relatively small number
impact on school segregation); Henry M. Levin, Education as a Public and Private Good, in
PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS (Neal E. Devins ed., 1989) (arguing that private markets
encourage specialization and discourage commonalities); see generally JONATHAN KOZOL,
SAVAGE INEQUALITIES (1991) (describing effects of racial segregation on black student perfor-
mance); AMY S. WELLS, A TIME TO CHOOSE (1993).
135. Terry M. Moe, Private Vouchers, in PRVATE VOUCHERS 1, 23-26 (Terry M. Moe ed.,
1995); see also MOE, supra note 126, at 10 (stating that "readers should be aware that I am a
supporter of vouchers").
136. See VITERITI, supra note 123, at 49 (discussing existence of racial separation in
schools today); Gary Orfield & John T. Yun, Resegregation in American Schools (June 1999),
at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/resegschools99.php (reviewing
trends shown by demographic statistics on racial segregation).
137. See generally DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (discussing how racial segregation
is principal cause of creation of underclass).
138. This and related points are developed more fully in Ryan & Heise, supra note 5.
139. JAY P. GREENE, CHOICE AND COMMUNITY: THE RACIAL, ECONOMIC, AND RELIIOUS
CONTEXT OF PARENTAL CHOICE IN CLEVELAND 5-8 (The Buckeye Inst. for Pub. Policy Solu-
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of program participants along with the availability of comparatively integrated
inner-city private schools. 4
b. Productive Competition
Many school choice advocates argue that choice will improve the effi-
ciency and achievement of public schools by increasing competition. This
argument comports with general economic theory, which posits that schools
will respond to increased competition by increasing their efficiency and
productivity.14" ' However, more refined applications of economic and political
theory to the particular complexities incident to the education context provide
less definitive guidance.'42 On the one hand, choice might spur productive
competition and raise the achievement levels of all schools. On the other hand,
it might result in advantaged (for example, by wealth or achievement) students
clustering in advantaged schools, with which less advantaged schools could not
realistically compete. Until quite recently, a paucity of data hamstrung efforts
to test the competing hypotheses empirically. Although new data are emerg-
ing, they are scant and support only tentative conclusions."' Finally, as is
frequently the case in the education literature, existing evidence on many
salient points is mixed.'44
tions, Policy Report, 1999) (reporting demographic data from Cleveland).
140. See, e.g., Nicole Garnett, The NAACP's Parent Trap, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 30,
1996-Jan. 6, 1997, at 16, 17 (reporting that "[m]any of the private and religious schools in
inner-city Milwaukee are more integrated than their public counterparts, some of which are
virtually all black"); Paul E. Peterson & Jay P. Greene, Race Relations & Central City Schools:
It's Time for an Experiment with Vouchers, BROOKINGS REV., Spr. 1998, at 33, 36 (reporting
statistics that show that private schools are typically "less racially isolated than their public
school peers").
141. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 82-98 (1962) (describing
economic effects of increased competition).
142. See, e.g., Caroline M. Hoxby, Does Student Competition Among Public Schools
Benefit Students and Taxpayers?, 90 AMER. ECON. REv. 1209, 1210 (2000) (describing merits
of empirical work over theory); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Public Expendi-
tures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 416-18 (1956) (explaining problem of determining level of
expenditure on public goods).
143. See Cecilia E. Rouse & Michele McLaughlin, Can the Invisible Hand Improve
Education?: A Review of Competition and School Efficiency 50 (1998) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author) ("[T]he empirical literature on whether competition improves school
efficiency is somewhat unsatisfying.").
144. Compare JAYP. GREENE,ANEVALUATIONOFTHEFLORIDAA-PLUSACCOUNTABIITY
AND SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAM 11 (2001) (finding positive competitive effects in Florida), and
Frederick Hess et al., Coping with Competition: How School Systems Respond to School
Choice 25-27 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding positive competitive effects
in Arizona), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/pepg/pdf/coping.pdf (last visited Jan. 3,
2002), with CHRISTOPHERR. GELLERET AL., THE EFFECTOF PRIVATE SCHOOL COMPETITIONON
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Limitations aside, some tentative conclusions are nonetheless possible.
On balance, research findings tilt in a direction that supports the proposition
that increased school competition results in some increased school effective-
ness. Professor Hoxby has found that increased competition for public schools
generated positive effects on student achievement and has noted that these
effects are more robust in districts with less educated adults and in districts
located in states with higher degrees of local control. 4 Additional findings
suggest that increased competition can stimulate high school graduation
rates," direction of greater resources to the classroom,'47 and overall school
performance.1
48
If we assume, as seems quite plausible, that increased competition among
schools for students provides positive benefits, a critical question that remains
is whether school choice programs will spur such competition and generate the
hypothesized (and observed) benefits. One intuitive suggestion is that limited
choice programs generate limited competitive pressures that, in turn, stimulate
limited competitive effects. 49 The admittedly few and small voucher programs
supply one source of data regarding school competition. The scant data that
exist, however (and not surprisingly), remain in dispute. Assessments of the
competitive effects of Florida's voucher program illustrate this point. The
Florida A-Plus Program, first administered in 1998, assigns annual grades to
every public school in Florida. A school's grade is based on its students'
PUBLIC SCHOOL PERFORMANcE 20-23 (Nat'l Ctr. for the Study of Privatization in Educ.,
Occasional Paper No. 15, 2001) (finding little evidence of competitive effects in Georgia),
Gregory Camilli & Katrina Bulkley, Critique of "An Evaluation of the Florida A-Plus Pro-
gram, "9 EDuc. POL'YANALYSIs ARCHIVES (2001), at http://epaa.asu.edu/paa/v9n7/(challeng-
ing Greene's findings on Florida Program), and Haggai Kupermintz, The Effects of Vouchers
on School Improvement: Another Look at the Florida Data, 9 EDuC. POL'Y ANALYSIS AR-
CHIVES (2001), at http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v9n8/ (arguing that improvements in Florida program
are function of one of three tested areas).
145. See generally Hoxby, supra note 142 (discussing benefits of Tiebout choice); Rouse
& McLaughlin, supra note 143, at 40 (summarizing Hoxby's conclusions).
146. See Thomas S. Dee, Competition and the Quality ofPublic Schools, 17 ECON. EDUC.
REv. 419,424 (1998) (discussing relationship between competition and graduation rates).
147. See THOMAS S. DEE, EXPENSE PREFERENCE AND STUDENTACHIEVEMENT IN SCHOOL
DISTRICTs 21 (Univ. of Md. Dep't of Econ., Working Paper, 1998) (concluding that competi-
tion results in more resources used for instruction); CAROINE HOXBY, Do PRIVATE SCHOoLs
PROVIDE COMPETITION FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 6 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper
No. 4978, 1995) (stating that "it is clear that private school competitiveness makes the total
school budget depend positively on public school productivity"), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w4978.
148. See GREENE, supra note 144, at ii (summarizing positive effects of competition on
school performance).
149. See generally Frederick M. Hess, The Work Ahead, EDUC. NEXT, Win. 2001, at 8
(discussing likely results of array of stimuli on public schools).
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performances on the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Tests (FCAT) in
reading, writing, and math. If a school receives two "F" grades in a four-year
period, students assigned to that school are eligible for state vouchers that can
be redeemed at another private or public school in Florida. After the pro-
gram's second year of operation, only two schools received two failing grades
within the four-year window. Students attending those two schools were
eligible for state-funded vouchers. Approximately 50 students availed them-
selves of the voucher opportunity, and most chose to attend nearby private,
religiously-affiliated schools. The 2000 FCAT results did not generate any
additional schools that met the two "F" grades within a four-year period
threshold. Consequently, the program did not offer tuition vouchers to the
students of any other schools. 50
Jay Greene has explored the hypothesis that Florida schools receiving
one "F" grade have the greatest incentive to improve student performance to
avoid the prospect of losing students because of the availability of state-
funded vouchers."' In his analysis of FCAT score changes from 1999 to
2000, he found that schools that received grades of "A," "B," or "C" did not
change appreciably. 2 Greene notes, however, that schools that received a
grade of "D" "appear to have achieved somewhat greater improvements than
those achieved by the schools with higher state grades.""1 3 Moreover, schools
that received "F" grades in 1999 experienced statistically significant increases
in their test scores that were "more than twice as large as those experienced
by schools with higher state-assigned grades." '154 By comparing only those
schools that had received a "high-F" grade with schools that had received a
"low-D" grade, Greene ascribes the gains achieved by "higher-scoring F
schools," which exceeded those realized by the "low-D" schools, to the
competitive threat posed by the prospect of vouchers.'
Others, however, ascribe the "dramatic improvements" in Florida's
failing schools to different factors.'56 Camilli and Bulkdey, for example,
challenge Greene's findings on methodological grounds. 5 Another observer
150. GREENE, supra note 144, at 2.




155. Id. at 8.
156. See, e.g., Kupermintz, supra note 144 (arguing that improvements are function of one
of three tested areas).
157. Camilli & Bulkley, supra note 144 (arguing that Greene's neglect of regression to
mean and identification of voucher program's unique net effect bias his analysis). For Greene's
response, see Jay P. Greene, A Reply to Critique of "An Evaluation of the Florida A-Plus
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agrees with Green's findings about score improvements, especially by low-
scoring schools, but argues that those schools attention to the writing compo-
nent of Florida's testing regime, and not the "voucher effect," was the crucial
difference that generated the improved scores.'
c. Student Achievement
For most, the ultimate barometer of an education policy's efficacy is
whether more students learn more. Evidence on the actual or potential influ-
ence of school choice on student academic achievement, especially when
private schools are involved, has always been controversial. The controversy
originated again with Professor Coleman, who along with several colleagues
published the first major empirical study that examined differences in student
achievement between public and private (principally Catholic) schools.
Coleman and his colleagues found that students in private schools performed
slightly better, after controlling for student race and socioeconomic back-
ground. 59  Their findings, not surprisingly, attracted criticism. 6 °  More
recently, for every study finding an advantage for private schools,' another
study either challenges such findings or concludes that little or no such advan-
tage exists.
162
The empirical research involving the Milwaukee voucher program illus-
trates the discord. 63 On the one hand, a study by the state-appointed evaluator
found no systematic differences in academic performance between voucher
and public school students in Milwaukee." Other researchers reanalyzing the
Accountability and School Choice Program" (2001) (arguing that Camilli & Bulkley article
mischaracterizes his findings), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/pepg/.
158. See Kupermintz, supra note 144 (arguing that improvements are function of one of
three tested areas).
159. COLEMANET AL., supra note 114, at 180.
160. See, e.g., Goldberger & Cain, supra note 116, at 119-21 (criticizing Coleman et al.
study for flaws in sampling, research design, and sample bias).
161. See, e.g., Hoxby, supra note 117, at 177 (predicting increased enrollment and
improved test scores for private schools).
162. See, e.g., Qamoran, supra note 117, at 14 ("One of the most consistent findings of the
study was the absence of any net achievement benefits to those who attended nonreligious
private schools.").
163. Although the academic discord involves such technical issues as selection bias,
control groups, research design, and regression equation, the rancor surrounding the research
on the Milwaukee voucher program has managed to spill into the national press. See, e.g., Bob
Davis, Class Warfare: Dueling Professors Have Milwaukee Dazed Over School Vouchers,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 1996, at Al (discussing how two prominent social scientists have clashing
viewpoints on Milwaukee experiment data).
164. See JOHN F. WITTE, THE MARKET APPROACH TO EDUCATION 125, 133-36 (2000)
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same data, however, reached the opposite conclusion.'65 In a third independent
analysis of the disputed Milwaukee data, Professor Rouse found a modest
systemic advantage for voucher students in mathematics but no similar advan-
tage in reading performance."
Despite the lingering disputes about its use, social science research
increasingly finds its way into legal arguments.167 Interestingly, although the
use of social science evidence in the education context arcs directly back to
Brown and footnote eleven, others have used empirical evidence in a variety
of different ways over the years. Despite important variation, some constants
remain. One constant is that, as the post-Brown education litigation experience
demonstrates, serious litigants pushing serious equal education opportunity
claims almost invariably draw on social science evidence. This holds true
whether the specific context is school desegregation, finance, or choice.
Moreover, even though judicial opinions since Brown have shied away from
mooring critical legal conclusions exclusively on social science research,
courts are increasingly mindful of the research germane to the legal questions
presented. Finally, if nothing else, observers have noted that despite its
limitations and technical flaws, the quality of social science available for and
used by litigants involved in equal education lawsuits today far exceeds that
which the Court relied upon in Brown in 1954."
III. Some Consequences of the Warren Court's Empirical Legacy
A complete understanding of the potential significance of the Warren
Court legacy will probably not be possible for another generation or two, if at
all. That said, after some thirty years since the close of the Warren Court, its
imprint on the equal educational opportunity doctrine through incorporating
empirical social science has already emerged with surprising clarity. I will
focus on two main consequences of this legacy. One consequence relates to
the implications for the equal education doctrine. A second consequence is
institutional and involves thrusting courts and lawyers into the relatively
unfamiliar intellectual terrain of social science.
(arguing that voucher students in Milwaukee do not perform better on reading and math tests).
165. See, e.g., Paul E. Peterson, School Choice: A Report Card, 6 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L.
47, 70-71 (1998) (arguing that Milwaukee's voucher students improved performance).
166. See Cecilia E. Rouse, Private School Vouchers and Student Achievement, 113 Q.J.
EcoN. 553, 592-94 (1998) (analyzing Milwaukee data with respect to math and reading
performance); see also Levin, supra note 103, at 378 (concurring in Rouse's "careful analysis").
167. To see how some ofthis research reached the U.S. Supreme Court in the Zelman case,
see supra note 131.
168. See Viteritti, supra note 51, at 113-15 (describing relatively high quality of school
choice empirical research).
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A. How an Empirical Mooring Influences Equal Education
A fair analysis of the overall efficacy of the influence of the Warren
Court's empirical legacy must include a balanced assessment of the associated
benefits and costs. Paradoxically, some of the attributes that enhance equal
education lawsuits can also make such litigation both difficult and problem-
atic. A prime example is the inherent difficulty in measuring something as
elusive as notions of equal education. Notably, on a mechanical level, the
equal education doctrine is difficult to operationalize with any consistency and
rigor. Numerous variables move in different directions simultaneously,
increasing the complexity of an already difficult task. Even if precise mathe-
matical formulations were possible, others challenges lurk. One potential
discomfort for plaintiffs is that defendants can marshal their own empirical
evidence to defend particular policies against legal challenges.
To be sure, an empirical orientation influences the equal education
doctrine in ways that generate important benefits for those pushing constitu-
tional litigation. As previously discussed, credible empirical findings relating
to potential harms flowing from specific education policies can effectively
obviate the traditional need to establish individualized harm and causation for
each named plaintiff. 69 Moreover, empirical evidence supplies courts and
judges with something resembling a judicially discoverable and manageable
standard under which to assess claims about unequal educational opportu-
nity.7 Additionally, it provides courts with a seemingly objective and neutral
framework to point to as they reach difficult conclusions on vexingly compli-
cated questions. A related byproduct is that an empirical orientation prompts
litigators as well as judges to think more critically, analytically, and precisely
about the contested issues. Moreover, the prevalence of empirical evidence
encourages litigants to develop empirical dimensions of their evidentiary base
and to craft legal arguments with an eye toward social science. Finally, these
benefits appear fixed. Having incorporated social science evidence in such a
seminal, public, and far-reaching decision as Brown, the Court is effectively
estopped from ignoring similar evidence advanced in subsequent litigation
involving equal educational opportunity.
Such doctrinal benefits flowing from an empirical mooring must be
considered in light of related costs. Although it is important not to minimize
the significance of the mechanical difficulties associated with empirically
mooring equal education, a distinct and more significant cost is conceptual.
Specifically, one major cost flows from the narrowing effect that the empirical
169. See supra Part HI.B (discussing empiricization of equal educational opportunity
doctrine under Warren Court).
170. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing Brown's use of social
science to measure harm).
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orientation exerts on the doctrine's development and interpretation. Thus,
even if equal education somehow could be distilled accurately into a mathe-
matical equation, important normative questions would still linger. At bottom,
some commentators question the appropriateness of reducing judicial determi-
nations of equal education to an empirical point."' To some, questions about
particular policies' implications for equal education are best cast as a question
about constitutional values and "simple justice," '72 not regression equations.
That regression equations continue to exert considerable pull in the education
context is a direct consequence of the Warren Court. Thus, the orientation of
equal education around empirical social science - in some cases, raw
statistics - deflects judges from articulating constitutional values or norms.
Moreover, one of the purported benefits of an empirical mooring -
tethering illusive notions about equal education to a seemingly neutral and
objective empirical framework - can mask potential subterfuge.' 73 More
specifically, given the inherent imprecision and limitations of empirical
analyses of complex issues (such as equal education), responsible social
scientists acknowledge substantial ambiguity and latitude regarding some
assessments of correlation among key variables and regarding what should be
properly inferred from results. Judges and lawyers may seize upon these
ambiguities and cloak personal preferences and client interests with social
scientific garb to seek the veneer of empirical precision when little exists. To
the extent that such opportunities exist and judges and lawyers seize them, the
utility of empirical social science is diminished.
B. Institutional Costs
The Warren Court's empiricization of the equal educational opportunity
doctrine also generates institutional costs. A constantly evolving (and grow-
ing) docket of cases advancing equal educational opportunity claims, com-
bined with the doctrine's empirical mooring, imposes institutional costs by
thrusting courts, judges, and lawyers further into comparatively unfamiliar
intellectual terrain.
Judges recognize their own limitations in dealing with empirical social
science evidence.174 Judges, almost all of whom are legally trained and a
171. See, e.g., Viteritti, supra note 51, at 115 ("The notion that a panel of objective
scholars will some day produce conclusive evidence to predict the educational and social
consequences of a vigorous voucher program is sheer fantasy.").
172. Id. at 117.
173. I am indebted to my colleague James E. Ryan for raising this possibility.
174. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) ("It is unrealistic to expect either
members of the judiciary or state officials to be well versed in the rigors of experimental or
statistical technique."). But cf David L. Faigman, To Have and Not Have: Assessing the Value
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product of the American legal education system, typically lack formal gradu-
ate training in research methodology. As a result, judges do not typically
possess the requisite research tools to conduct, or even to assess critically,
empirical research. Fewer still possess the inclination or time to update their
existing research skills or analytical repertoire. To conduct or assess empiri-
cal research requires more than the traditional legal reasoning, research, and
analytical skills that law schools impart to their students. If today only a
handful of law schools offer a single course in statistics, research design, or
empirical legal methods' - required staples in most graduate social science
programs - far fewer did so years ago when most of today's judges were law
students.
In addition to a general unfamiliarity with empirical social science,
another source of frustration for judges is that they are frequently asked to
resolve disputes that pivot on empirical questions that either lack an empirical
research base or rest on research that is underdeveloped, inconclusive, or both.
Anxiety over empirical uncertainty is especially apt in the equal education
context. As discussed previously, when litigants push questions that pivot on
asserted relations between student academic achievement and a school's (or
district's) racial distribution, key dependent variables, such as student
achievement, are notoriously difficult to measure." 6 One aspect that distin-
guishes much social science in general - and education research in particular -
is the reluctance, indeed, the general aversion to permit scholars to design and
implement "pure" scientific protocols, which include control groups.'77 The
use of human subjects, especially schoolchildren, in such research is all but
non-existent.' Consequently, research must often proceed with "second-
best" research designs.
of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1080-82 (1989)
(explaining ways to facilitate understanding of social science in judicial settings).
175. The number of courses in empirical methods offered to law students is increasing.
Presently, approximately twenty law schools offer such courses. I am inclined to believe that
within five years the number of such courses will easily double. In ten or twenty years such
courses may be ubiquitous in law schools. For more discussion, see Michael Heise, The
Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REv. 807, 817 n.50 (1999) (discussing empirical
course offerings in law schools); Heise, supra note 7.
176. See supra Part ll.C (discussing legacy of Warren Court in litigation involving
empirical evidence).
177. For example, in the school choice context, Professor Caroline Hoxby describes
random-assignment as the "gold-standard" of research designs. See Caroline M. Hoxby, Effects
of Vouchers on Students and Families, in CAMBRIDGE SCHOOL CHOICE CONFERENCE 72, 85
(Manhattan Inst. Conference Series No. 5, 2000) (describing desired methodological character-
istics of empirical research on school choice programs).
178. See Henig, supra note 130, at 90-97 (discussing how selection bias flows from
allowing parents, rather than research teams, to select their children's schools).
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Related to questions about how well courts handle increasingly technical
empirical evidence are normative questions about whether courts should do so.
Strong institutional reasons augur caution. As previously discussed, judges
traditionally lack training in social sciences. Moreover, judicial chambers,
staffed principally with law clerks, administrative assistants, and other support
staff, are not set up to review - let alone conduct - primary social science
research.
Of course, other factors point in the opposite direction. For example, the
absence of formal trainng is not (nor should it be) dispositive on the issue of
whether courts should consider empirical evidence. After all, judges lack
formal training in many of the areas into which litigants thrust them. Also, a
functional understanding of the "exotica of empirical social science" is almost
assuredly within the reach of most interested jurists. Finally, because Article
III courts are fundamentally reactive due to the case and controversy require-
ment, where judges and courts find themselves flows substantially (though not
exclusively179) from where litigants take them. And litigants' already signifi-
cant use of empirical evidence continues to rise.
Another related, but distinct, dimension to the institutional limitations
involves the larger question about the efficacy of judicial efforts to influence
public policy, including education policy. Setting aside the important norma-
tive considerations, whether the Warren Court (or other courts) as a descriptive
matter can achieve what they set out to achieve is a matter of considerable
debate. Indeed, the influence of the Warren Court's Brown decision on the
public policy favoring integrated schools is implicated in this larger debate.
Professor Rosenberg's The Hollow Hope80 re-ignited the legal impact litera-
ture."' To be sure, legal impact literature remains largely underdeveloped and
overwhelmingly descriptive." 2 In The Hollow Hope, Professor Rosenberg
asks, "[T]o what degree, and under what conditions, can judicial processes be
179. Of course, courts certainly have at their disposal the political question doctrine. It is
conceivable that such a doctrine could be invoked when a court believes that the terrain into
which litigants want to trench is not sufficiently "legal."
180. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991).
181. The legal impact literature has been characterized as "small but exceedingly stimulat-
ing and valuable." Peter H. Schuck, Public Law Litigation and Social Reform, 102 YALE L.J.
1763, 1764 (1993) (reviewing GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYEIuNG: ONE CHIcANo's
VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRAcTIcE (1992), and ROSENBERG, supra note 180).
182. Of course, important contributions to the legal impact literature exist, and some of
these are empirical. See generally PAUL T. HILL & DOREN L. MADEY, EDUCATIONAL POLICY
MAKING THROUGH THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1982) (examining implementation of federal
handicapped legislation through federal courts); HOROWrrz, supra note 85 (analyzing role of
courts in educational policy making); MIcHAELA. REBELL& ARTHm R. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL
POLICY MAKING AND THE COURTS: AN EMPIPICAL STUDY OF JUDICLALACTVISM (1982) (same).
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used to produce political and social change?"'183 Rosenberg's inquiry raises yet
another question: Did the empiricization of the equal educational opportunity
doctrine contribute, impede, or not influence the Court's ability to achieve
greater equity in the school context?
IV Conclusion
To answer such a question presupposes that courts should, as a normative
matter, draw on empirical social science when construing equal educational
opportunity. As a dedicated and practicing empiricist, I find that such an
assumption flows almost instinctively from me. Moreover, on one level,
legitimate empirical dimensions lurk behind and permeate core equal education
disputes. At the same time, however, many equal education disputes also raise
issues that transcend numbers. In addition, my experience with empirical legal
research has at once enhanced my view of how it can contribute to and inform
traditional legal doctrine, as well as given me a healthy respect for empiri-
cism's limitations.
Regardless of one's perspective on the growing empiricization of the law
generally, it is important to put the implications for equal education, as well as
our quest for better and fairer schools, into a broader context. As I have
stressed previously, the Warren Court's contribution to the equal education
doctrine's empiricization, achieved largely through Brown, took place while
law and legal scholarship were becoming increasingly empirical. Thus, the
Brown opinion is simultaneously a contributor to, and reflection of, a larger
empirical orientation. Indeed, movement in legal scholarship both pushes and
reflects this same trend. As Dean Revesz notes, the movement of the legal
academy toward empirical research is among the most significant legal devel-
opments in the past few decades.' The thrust provided by Brown remains
important. Although the Warren Court is far from the sole cause of this trend,
its contribution to the equal education doctrine surely influenced this trend.
The equal education doctrine and the increased integration of empirical social
science into legal analysis are both individually and collectively important.
Together they help shape the Warren Court legacy.
183. ROSENBERG, supra note 180, at 1.
184. See Richard L. Revesz,A Defense of EmpiricalLegal Scholarship, 69 U. CIH. L. REV.
169, 188 (2002) (discussing modem trend towards use of empirical research).
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